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e explore the role of resource interactions in explaining ﬁrm performance in the context of acquisitions. Although
we conﬁrm that acquisitions do not lead to higher performance on average, we do ﬁnd that complementary resource
proﬁles in target and acquiring ﬁrms are associated with abnormal returns. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that acquiring ﬁrm marketing
resources and target ﬁrm technology resources positively reinforce (complement) each other; meanwhile, acquiring and
target ﬁrm technology resources negatively reinforce (substitute) one another. Implications for management theory and
practice are identiﬁed.
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Introduction

level of another resource (Sigglekow 2002). However,
ﬁrm resource transfers may also serve as substitutes
(Capron and Mitchell 1998, King et al. 2003, Miller
2003) or display negative interactions (Sigglekow 2002).
We examine resource interactions involving both substitutes and complements between acquiring and target
ﬁrm resources.
Although an acquiring ﬁrm’s ability to achieve improved performance is likely to depend on interdependence between its resources and those of the target ﬁrm,
there is limited research that empirically examines target
and acquiring ﬁrm resource interactions on ﬁrm performance (Song et al. 2005). For example, in three different
studies, Capron and her colleagues use a methodology
largely reliant on survey data, showing that substantial
resource integration occurs following acquisitions and
that this plays a key role in a ﬁrm’s potential adaptation
and value creation (Capron and Mitchell 1998, Capron
and Hulland 1999, Capron and Pistre 2002). Additionally, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999), relying on a case
survey method, show that the complementary interaction
between acquiring and target ﬁrm resources can produce
synergy realization. Finally, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006)
examine a subgroup of acquisitions involving online
ﬁrms to demonstrate the potential for resource transfers. Although these studies have signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
our understanding of the value of interconnectedness
between acquirer and target ﬁrm resources, examination
of resource interactions remains an issue deserving of
additional research (King et al. 2004, Song et al. 2005,
Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). In response to this need, we

The value of worldwide merger and acquisition (M&A)
activity set a new record in 2006 with $3.79 trillion worth of transactions—a 38% increase over 2005
(Berman 2007a).1 The dominant rationale used to explain acquisition activity is that acquiring ﬁrms seek
higher performance (Bergh 1997, Hoskisson and Hitt
1990, Sirower 1997). However, existing M&A research
has not consistently identiﬁed variables that impact
acquisition performance (King et al. 2004). These mixed
signals represent an apparent inconsistency or unsolved
puzzle (Agrawal and Jaffe 2000), because ﬁrms continue
to use acquisitions as a strategic tool with no evidence
establishing that acquisitions improve ﬁrm performance.
Consequently, there is a recognized need for research
to identify a theoretical framework that helps to explain
acquisition performance (Hitt et al. 1998, Hoskisson
et al. 1994, Sirower 1997).
Research on resource interdependence may offer such
a framework (Barney 1988, Capron et al. 1998, Capron
and Mitchell 1998, Capron and Pistre 2002, King et al.
2004). Using resource-based theory (RBT) as a theoretical lens, research in this area suggests that, in general,
acquisition performance will be higher when acquiring and target ﬁrm resources complement one another
(Capron and Pistre 2002; Hitt et al. 1998, 2001; King
et al. 2003; Puranam et al. 2006). Most extant research
on resource interconnectedness (Dierickx and Cool 1989)
has focused on positive reinforcement (Milgrom and
Roberts 1995, Tanriverdi and Venkatraman 2005, Teece
1986) or on complements, where the marginal beneﬁt
from higher levels of one resource increases from the
327
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contribute to the literature by using archival data to reinforce existing research through triangulation (Jick 1979)
with continuous, nonreactive measures that demonstrate
temporal precedence and the potential to advance theory
and conﬁdence in prior research (Singh et al. 2003).
We also contribute to existing research by using RBT
to explore heterogeneity in ﬁrm performance through
an examination of target and acquiring ﬁrm resource
interactions. This advances several identiﬁed research
needs by: (1) examining the reliance on another ﬁrm’s
resources to achieve competitive advantage (Dyer and
Singh 1998), (2) modeling interactions in M&A research
(Hoskisson and Hitt 1990), (3) empirically testing
hypotheses developed from RBT (Priem and Butler
2001), (4) examining whether acquisitions can be used
to gain access to technology (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006),
(5) helping to resolve the debate on whether acquired
research and development (R&D) acts as a complement
(Veugelers 1997) or substitute (Hitt et al. 1990), and (6)
exploring resource substitutability (Peteraf and Bergen
2003). Importantly, we also outline conditions where
acquisitions may contribute to improved ﬁrm performance (King et al. 2004). Thus, our study directly builds
on and extends existing management research.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

We use RBT to explore heterogeneity in ﬁrm performance following an acquisition. The foundation of RBT
identiﬁes resources as the drivers of ﬁrm heterogeneity (Penrose 1959). Barney (1991, p. 101) deﬁnes ﬁrm
resources as “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, ﬁrm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a ﬁrm that enable the ﬁrm to conceive of
and implement strategies that improve its efﬁciency
and effectiveness.” The conditions needed to identify a
“valuable” resource were further developed by Peteraf
(1993, p. 180), and we base our research on two of her
four conditions—resource heterogeneity and imperfect
resource mobility.
Resource heterogeneity reﬂects the assumption that
resources are unevenly distributed across ﬁrms (Barney
1991) because of either resource scarcity or information asymmetry. Scarcity of a preferred resource means
that only some ﬁrms will possess a resource that enables
improved efﬁciency and effectiveness, driving others to
use inferior resources with higher costs to meet demand.
The shortage of the preferred resource results in imperfect substitution that allows ﬁrms with the preferred
resource to enjoy higher performance. When transferring
resources, a search involving some degree of irreducible
uncertainty must occur (Szulanski 2000). This uncertainty is a result of an information asymmetry, where one
party may be better informed or causal ambiguity exists
toward the development, reﬁnement, use, or interconnectedness of resources. Imbalanced information is even
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greater when knowledge is the primary asset of a target ﬁrm (Coff 2003). Increasing a recipient’s familiarity
with information from the source of a transfer (Szulanski
2000) and bringing resources under a hierarchy (King
2006) are approaches to reducing this ambiguity.
We focus on technology resources because technology innovation is central to many industries and innovative capability is scarce (Berry and Taggart 1994).
Technology resources also exhibit information asymmetries that make these specialized resources valuable
(Zahra 1996). Resource information asymmetry also
contributes to imperfect resource mobility. An acquiring ﬁrm’s R&D intensity builds an absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990) that can mitigate
the difﬁculty of valuing specialized technology resources
that are difﬁcult to appraise and sell (Zahra 1996). An
implication is that ﬁrms may not represent an equal
threat to one another (Chen 1996) or have the same ability to create value from acquiring a given target ﬁrm’s
resources (Barney 1988).
We further develop RBT explanations for competitive
advantage (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993) by examining the
interaction of resources between a target and acquirer
to include exploring resource substitutability. The extent
to which rivals can compete on the basis of resource
substitution inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s a competitive advantage
(Peteraf and Bergen 2003). In general, the ability of rival
ﬁrms to substitute similar resources reduces competitive advantage (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993). However,
the impact of substitutes on competitive advantage can
be mitigated by time compression, economies of scale,
resource interactions and erosion, and causal ambiguity (Dierickx and Cool 1989, p. 1507) through rivals
applying imperfect resource substitutes. We hold that
the interaction of target and acquiring ﬁrm resources
should inﬂuence an acquiring ﬁrm’s subsequent performance. In the following sections, we develop and
empirically test hypotheses where target and acquiring ﬁrm resource relationships can be deﬁned as substitutes or complements. Resource substitution occurs
when a negative interaction exists or the marginal beneﬁt of each resource decreases in the level of the other
resource (Sigglekow 2002, p. 901). For our purposes,
resource substitution occurs when increases in levels of
“Resource A” decrease the marginal impact on performance of “Resource B.”2 Considering resource substitution is an important change from M&A research that
has traditionally focused on ﬁrm relatedness (Hitt et al.
2001).
Resource Substitution
Acquisitions allow for the purchase of resources, such
as target ﬁrm R&D, that are imperfectly mobile (Capron
and Mitchell 1998). So target ﬁrm R&D investments
represent a primary motivation for acquisition activity
(Ahuja and Katila 2001; Bresman et al. 1999; Ranft
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and Lord 2000, 2002; Heeley et al. 2006). Acquisitions
are often explored because an acquiring ﬁrm seeks a
ﬁrm with requisite capabilities that it lacks (Hoskisson
and Busenitz 2002, Heeley et al. 2006), with innovative
resources subsequently redeployed between acquiring
and target ﬁrms (Capron and Mitchell 1998). One expectation is that the larger a target ﬁrm’s R&D resources,
the greater the number of possible resource combinations in a combined ﬁrm. An increased number of possible R&D combinations, for example, may increase the
chances that a ﬁrm will develop a technological innovation (Henderson and Cockburn 1996, Nelson and Winter
1978, Zahra 1996). Meanwhile, recent research indicates that acquired R&D substitutes for internal R&D
(Blonigen and Taylor 2000, Heeley et al. 2006)—a position best explained by considering the nature of R&D.
R&D investment creates technology resources (Dierickx and Cool 1989, Grabowski and Vernon 1990) with
the uncertain promise of future innovation, but it also
requires limiting the funding of clear current needs.
Because ﬁrms that fail to take advantage of investment opportunities risk being unable to make comparable investments later (Hill and Rotharmel 2003), the
result is a dilemma where ﬁrms can either risk obsolescence and loss of market share (King et al. 2003)
or invest in R&D, where it is estimated that between
46% and 75% of spending goes toward products that
ultimately fail (Christensen and Raynor 2003, Hudson
1994).
A real options (McGrath 1999, McGrath and MacMillan 2000) perspective offers a potential way out of this
dilemma, with the implication that ﬁrms only need to
sustain a level of investment to maintain the option to
acquire proven technology. However, limited investment
may simply reserve ﬁrms the right to lose their investment later, if it proves insufﬁcient (Courtney et al. 1997).
If true, this suggests that ﬁrms may deliberately exceed
perceived thresholds to protect their investments.
As acquiring ﬁrms consider potential targets, their
search is generally limited to ﬁrms with similar R&D
allocation patterns (Harrison et al. 1991, Stewart et al.
1984, Wolpert 2002). In particular, the ability to effectively appraise (Zahra 1996) and create value (Barney
1988) from target ﬁrm technology resources requires that
an acquirer look in areas in which it is already performing some level of research. For example, Higgins
and Rodriguez (2006) found that the returns associated
with acquiring biotechnology ﬁrms are positively related
to the information accumulated by the acquirer prior
to the acquisition. Indeed, integration of a target ﬁrm’s
resources requires a minimum understanding of those
resources (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 1991, Szulanski
2000, Teece 1977); thus an acquiring ﬁrm’s “absorptive
capacity,” or its ability to recognize, assimilate, and convert new information to commercial ends (Cohen and
Levinthal 1989, 1990), is critical.
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The capacity to recognize and exploit external technology is a function of a ﬁrm’s R&D intensity that enables
an acquiring ﬁrm to integrate a target ﬁrm’s technology resources (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990; Nelson
and Winter 1978). This frequently limits the search
for acquisition targets to areas related to an acquiring
ﬁrm’s existing technological capabilities (Christensen
and Rosenbloom 1995, Stuart and Podolny 1996) because of industry-level paradigms that deﬁne technology
trajectories (Puranam et al. 2006). In particular, technology resources develop in a path-dependent manner
(Kogut and Zander 1996), with sustained investments
contributing to the depth of ﬁrm capabilities (Berry and
Taggart 1994, Helfat and Peteraf 2003).
The need for an acquirer to have absorptive capacity further implies that it must perform R&D in the
same general areas as a target ﬁrm to overcome information asymmetries that hinder integration of technology
resources. Thus, there may be signiﬁcant resource redundancy between target and acquiring ﬁrms (Zollo and
Singh 2004) or diminishing returns for acquirer R&D.3
We therefore expect that the acquisition of technology
resources will ﬁll speciﬁc resource needs of an acquiring ﬁrm (King et al. 2003) or that external R&D (at
least) serves as a partial substitute for internal development (Barkema and Vermeulen 1998; Blonigen and
Taylor 2000; Hitt et al. 1990, 1991). In particular, R&D
resources are imperfectly immobile, and acquirers not
only seek but will retain such resources to keep such specialized knowledge from rival ﬁrms (Capron and Pistre
2002). Thus, the more R&D resources an acquirer holds,
the greater the possibility of redundant resources following the acquisition of an R&D-intensive target. As a
result, lower returns can be expected from prior investments in those resources.4
The effect of a target ﬁrm’s technology resources
substituting for internal development can be anticipated
for two reasons. First, there will be resource redundancy resulting from an acquirer needing an absorptive
capacity, or a means of valuing and redeploying target
ﬁrm technology resources. External sourcing of R&D
investments represents a rational means of coping with
uncertainty (Heeley et al. 2006), assuming that after
uncertainty is reduced (McGrath 1999), ﬁrms can access
needed technology resources through acquisition (Dixit
1992). Second, the likelihood of any resource redundancy in a combined ﬁrm will increase with the size
of a target ﬁrm’s R&D investments. As R&D investments increase or exceed the speciﬁc technology needs
of an acquirer, a target’s technology resources become
less beneﬁcial (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006) and potentially
counterproductive. This meets Sigglekow’s (2002) condition for an interaction of substitutes. Therefore, the
following is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The interaction between target
technology resources and acquirer absorptive capacity
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in explaining post-acquisition ﬁrm performance involves
resource substitution (i.e., negative interaction).
Resource Complements
Resource complements represent a valuable source of
asymmetry (Miller 2003) and involve a situation where
the marginal beneﬁt of each resource increases with the
level of the other resource. Research on complementary resources stresses the importance of having speciﬁc
interconnected resources (Christman 2000, Moorman
and Slotegraaf 1999, Tanriverdi and Venkatraman 2005).
For our purposes, a complementary relationship exists
when different resources positively reinforce one another
or exhibit a positive interaction (Sigglekow 2002). In the
context of M&A activity, Williamson (1975) argues that
an efﬁcient approach to innovation is having technology
development or initial products acquired by ﬁrms able
to commercialize them.
Target ﬁrms are often sought for their strong technology resources (Ahuja and Katila 2001, Puranam et al.
2006, Schweizer 2005), which are redeployed within
an acquiring ﬁrm (Capron and Mitchell 1998). However, innovation and product development research supports the position that effective integration of R&D
and marketing contributes to successful outcomes (King
et al. 2003, Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999, Song et al.
2005), with effective communication between marketing and R&D functions proving critical to success
(Dougherty 1990, Grifﬁn and Hauser 1992). Although
both target and acquirer may exhibit similar marketing
resource allocation patterns (Stewart et al. 1984), this
is less likely to occur among high-technology acquisitions. Firms with relative strengths in marketing typically enter markets after technological uncertainty is
resolved (Lieberman and Montgomery 1998). R&Dintensive ﬁrms typically focus limited ﬁnancial resources
on technology investments over marketing, a resource
these ﬁrms often lack (King et al. 2003).
The interaction between acquirer marketing and target
R&D resources results from bilateral beneﬁts of marketing and R&D resources. Marketing resources increase
the value of R&D in at least two ways. First, marketing enables the successful commercialization of innovations. For example, marketing capabilities can improve
the success of innovation by increasing a ﬁrm’s ability to recognize customer needs, improving the position of a ﬁrm relative to competitors, and offering a
strong sales force for targeting speciﬁc customer segments (Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999, Teece 1988).
Marketing resources and advertising expenditures, in
particular, are a means of appropriating value for a ﬁrm’s
technological resources (Mizik and Jacobson 2003). Second, acquisition by a ﬁrm with an established brand
may enhance the legitimacy of a target ﬁrm’s product or
technology (Wernerfelt 1988). Firms with brand recognition, for example, have the potential for reputation
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spillovers that can be applied to other products or markets (Teece 1986, Wernerfelt 1988) without diminishing
the underlying value of a ﬁrm’s brand (Peteraf 1993,
Slotegraaf et al. 2003). Consistent with this relationship,
Capron and Hulland (1999) found that redeploying marketing resources has a positive impact on acquisition
performance. At the same time, technology resources
resulting from R&D also enhance the value of marketing resources (Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999). In
particular, a ﬁrm’s technological resources can enhance
customer relationships. For example, certain technologies can facilitate frequent product updates that enable
a ﬁrm to more quickly respond to customer demands
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Further, a ﬁrm’s technological resources facilitate its ability to absorb external
information (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
Given a positive reinforcement between marketing and
R&D resources to enhance innovation and performance
(Dutta et al. 1999, Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999, Teece
1988), acquirer performance will beneﬁt when it has
robust marketing resources to commercialize acquired
technology resources. This suggests that marketing and
R&D positively reinforce one another or that marketing and R&D represent resource complements. As such,
we expect ﬁrm performance will be higher when an
acquirer’s marketing resources and a target ﬁrm’s technology resources are both strong. Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The interaction between target
technology resources and acquirer marketing resources
in explaining post-acquisition ﬁrm performance involves
resource complements (i.e., positive interaction).5

Method
Sample
Our focus on the acquisition of R&D-intensive or hightechnology targets was theory driven. In particular,
high-technology acquisitions involve the exchange of
R&D resources that meet conditions of resource value
through heterogeneity or imperfect mobility (Peteraf
1993). Technology resources resulting from R&D are
also consistent with relationships of resource substitution or complements observed in M&A activity (Capron
and Mitchell 1998, Capron and Pistre 2002, Heeley et al.
2006, King et al. 2003, Teece 1988). Avoiding a wide
cross section of ﬁrms also limits the introduction of
extraneous effects identiﬁed as a concern with existing M&A research (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; King
et al. 2004; Ranft and Lord 2000, 2002).
We identiﬁed high-technology targets as ﬁrms operating in two-digit manufacturing and service industries
commonly recognized as high-technology that displayed
moderate R&D intensity prior to being acquired. Existing literature commonly recognizes seven two-digit
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industry sectors as high-technology industries: chemicals (28), computer equipment (35), electronics (36),
aerospace (transportation: 37), instruments (38), communications (48), and software (business services: 73)
(Certo et al. 2001, Ranft and Lord 2000). Moderate
R&D intensity was operationally deﬁned as R&D-tosales of 2% or greater. This value was based on rounding up from what has been reported as the overall
industry average R&D-to-sales ﬁgure of 1.5% (Cohen
and Klepper 1992, Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987). This
enabled us to conservatively and objectively identify target ﬁrms as reasonably R&D intensive without unduly
restricting our sample. An advantage of including an
R&D intensity screen was the elimination of ﬁrms in
industries such as woodworking machinery (Standard
Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC) 3533) that otherwise may
be included in a sample based only on two-digit industry
membership.
We examined publicly traded, high-technology
ﬁrms that were acquired between January 1, 1994,
and December 31, 1997. This time frame offered control over known impacts of the business cycle on acquisition activity (Lubatkin et al. 1997, Ramanujam and
Varadarajan 1989) by ensuring that all measurement was
limited to a period of similar economic conditions. Additionally, we restricted our sample to target ﬁrms with
a market capitalization of at least $10 million. Imposing such a restriction is consistent with the lower bound
observed in prior acquisition research (Ranft and Lord
2002, Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987). After applying
these screens, a census of 312 high-technology ﬁrms was
identiﬁed.
To identify the ﬁnal sample, however, two additional
restrictions were applied. First, acquisitions were eliminated if target and acquiring ﬁrms’ were not identiﬁed
in COMPUSTAT with non-zero four-digit SIC codes.6
This enabled controlling for industry effects by focusing on ﬁrms operating primarily in a single industry. It
also offered the beneﬁt of controlling for potential confounding effects of diversiﬁed ﬁrms (Berger and Ofek
1995). This restriction also enabled us to use a categorical measure of target and acquiring ﬁrm relatedness as
a control variable for diversiﬁcation (Hoskisson et al.
1993). For example, Larsson et al. (2004) suggest that
more closely related acquisition targets offer more strategic potential. The second restriction was that acquiring
ﬁrms had to be present in the Center for Research on
Security Prices (CRSP) database to allow calculation of
our dependent measures. The ﬁnal sample included 133
ﬁrms, or 42% of the ﬁrms meeting our initial screening
criteria.
Measures
Dependent Variable. We rely on Jensen’s alpha to
measure an acquiring ﬁrm’s abnormal return. Jensen’s
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alpha has been used previously in diversiﬁcation
research (Farjoun 1998; Hoskisson et al. 1993, 1994).
It measures the average difference or abnormal return
between competing investments (Alexander and Francis
1986, Jensen 1968). (See appendix for discussion of
Jensen’s alpha). Once calculated for each ﬁrm, Jensen’s
alpha was used as the dependent variable in a crosssectional regression model to test our hypothesized
effects (Campbell et al. 1997).
Independent Variables. Target ﬁrm R&D resources
were measured using a ﬁrm’s stock of R&D investments.7 The use of R&D expenditures as a proxy to measure R&D resources is consistent with existing research
(Ahuja and Katila 2001, Ahuja and Lampert 2001,
Dutta et al. 2005, Veugelers 1997). R&D is a recognized part of developing technology resources that are
built over time through cumulative investments (Cohen
and Levinthal 1989, Ethiraj et al. 2005, Henderson and
Cockburn 1996, Zahra 1996). Similar to Griliches and
Mairesse (1984) and Heeley et al. (2006), we measured
a ﬁrm’s R&D stock using a cumulative R&D measure of
a ﬁrm’s R&D investments depreciated by 15% per year
for three years to account for the possibility that more
recent R&D is more valuable (Dierickx and Cool 1989).8
Data on a ﬁrm’s R&D expenditures were obtained from
COMPUSTAT (data code 46).
Similar to Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990), we
measured acquiring ﬁrm absorptive capacity using R&D
intensity. Speciﬁcally, the measure used was a ﬁrm’s
R&D intensity minus the average R&D intensity of
ﬁrms in its industry to control for industry effects (Dess
et al. 1990). Industry R&D intensity, obtained from
COMPUSTAT, was calculated using the average R&D
intensity for all ﬁrms with the same four-digit SIC code.
The resulting relative R&D intensity measure was averaged for the prior three years to represent a ﬁrm’s
level of commitment (Dierickx and Cool 1989) to R&D,
while controlling for annual variation. Firm and industry R&D intensity were calculated using data available
from COMPUSTAT (R&D expenditures (data code 46)
divided by sales (data code 12)).9
Acquiring ﬁrm marketing resources were measured
using a ﬁrm’s cumulative advertising investments, depreciated by 15% per year for three years. We relied on
advertising investments because they represent a key
component of a ﬁrm’s marketing resources (Dutta et al.
1999). A ﬁrm’s advertising investments are highly
related to its marketing know-how (Reuer 2001) and its
ability to build and differentiate brands (Langlois 2003).
Thus, marketing resources can play a critical role in a
ﬁrm’s ability to recognize and target customer needs and
position products relative to competitors (Day 1994).
Data on a ﬁrm’s advertising expenditures were obtained
from COMPUSTAT (data code 45).
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Control Variables. We also controlled for extraneous
effects that could inﬂuence the ease of integration and
signal or impact acquisition performance. First, we controlled for an acquisition’s “announcement effect” using
a binary variable based on Sirower’s (1997) observation that short-term stock market reactions may serve
as a signal for long-term acquisition performance. (See
appendix for a description of this control.) Second, we
controlled for the relative size of ﬁrms using a ratio of
target ﬁrm market capitalization to acquiring ﬁrm market capitalization (Sirower 1997) four weeks prior to an
acquisition announcement. We use market capitalization,
as it helps signal the value of a target ﬁrm’s resources
and also represents the starting price for which target
shareholders would be willing to sell their ownership
interest to an acquiring ﬁrm.10 Additionally, this variable
helps account for research suggesting that smaller ﬁrms
are easier to integrate (Alvarez and Barney 2001).
Third, ﬁrm proﬁtability prior to an acquisition could
impact post-acquisition performance (Kusewitt 1985,
Vermeulen and Barkema 2001). Therefore, for the year
preceding the acquisition, a ratio of acquiring ﬁrm
industry-adjusted return-on-sales (ROS) to target ﬁrm
industry-adjusted ROS was calculated and included in
the model.11 Fourth, an acquiring ﬁrm’s debt capacity,
measured using its current ratio (current assets/current
liabilities) in the year prior to an acquisition, was
included because it provides information about a ﬁrm’s
leverage and ﬁnancial burden. Fifth, the relatedness of an
acquisition was included and measured using a categorical entropy measure (Hoskisson et al. 1993) to control
for the higher potential for related targets (Larsson et al.
2004).
Sixth, we control for target industry type. Our sample
includes both service and manufacturing ﬁrms, although
existing M&A research largely relies on samples of manufacturing ﬁrms (Empson 2000). Seventh, we control
for an acquiring ﬁrm’s acquisition experience, measured
similar to Hayward (2002) as the sum of the number
Table 1

a

Analysis. Moderated multiple regression was used
to test our hypothesized relationships because it is
recommended for detecting interactions (Sharma et al.
1981). Further, the incremental contributions of the
explanatory variable main and interaction effects were
analyzed in a forward stepwise fashion. Finally, all predictor variable coefﬁcients were standardized to facilitate
interpretation of results (Aiken and West 1991).

Results

The means, standard deviations, and correlations for the
research variables are shown in Table 1. Before continuing with our regression analysis, a few results are worth
highlighting. First, all correlations are well under the
recommended 0.8 threshold that would indicate problems with multicollinearity (Gujarati 1995, p. 355). Second, consistent with existing research (King et al. 2004),
the Jensen’s alpha in our sample of acquiring ﬁrms
exhibited a mean abnormal return of zero, indicating
that the acquisitions, on average, did not result in abnormal returns. Third, the average relative R&D intensity
for acquiring ﬁrms was −296, a R&D intensity level
signiﬁcantly less than zero (p < 0001). Recall that our
measure of R&D intensity is industry adjusted, so an
R&D intensity signiﬁcantly less than zero means that
an acquirer is spending signiﬁcantly less on R&D than
other ﬁrms in the industry.12 This suggests that acquiring ﬁrms use the acquisition of technology resources as
a substitute for internal R&D.
Table 2 shows results from the multiple regression
analysis. The independent effect for relative size in both
models is signiﬁcant (p < 005). Normally, this would

Variable Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa

Variable
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

of acquisitions that the ﬁrm completed in the previous
three years. Finally, we controlled for the year, or time
impact, of an acquisition using dummy variables, with
1994 serving as the reference year. All variables were
calculated from data available in COMPUSTAT, CRSP,
or Security Data Corporation databases.

Mean S.D.

1

Jensen’s alpha
000 0.02 1
Acquirer R&D
−296 5.83 000
Target R&D
050 1.41 000
Acquirer marketing −011 0.46 −001
Relative proﬁtability
004 0.47 004
Relative size
010 0.21 026∗∗
Acquirer debt
−170 3.47 012
Relatedness
182 1.29 016
Acquirer experience 112 1.56 000
Target ﬁrm type
030 0.46 −001
Announcement
035 0.48 012
1994
031 0.46 −021∗
1995
026 0.44 006
1996
021 0.41 008

n = 133; ∗ p ≤ 005;

∗∗

p ≤ 001.

2

3

1
−014
1
−005
001
004
001
−008
004
024∗∗ −013
−010
018∗
−003
005
029∗∗ −012
−004 −001
003
003
001
000
003
005

4

1
000
003
−007
−004
006
−0027∗∗
−011
−009
007
008

5

6

7

1
−003 1
−002 001 1
001 006 013
−001 −002 −011
013 001 016
−005 007 −013
−007 −002 005
−006 −004 017∗
−005 007 −007

8

9

10

11

12

13

1
1
−019∗
014 −002
1
−016
007
001 1
−001 −001
002 −007 1
−010
024∗∗ 005 007 −039∗∗ 1
003
000 −006 009 −035∗∗ −031∗∗
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Table 2

Multiple Regression Resultsa

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Relative proﬁtability
Relative size
Acquirer debt
Relatedness
1995
1996
1997
Acquirer experience
Target ﬁrm type
Announcement effect
Acquirer marketing
Acquirer R&D
Target R&D

004
023∗
013
016†
−025∗
−006
−005
006
−007
013
−002
003
−002

005
024∗
014
020∗
−029∗
−007
−006
008
−010
015†
003
006
−030∗

Resource substitution
Interaction of target and acquirer
R&D (H1)

−021∗

Resource complements
Interaction of acquirer marketing and
target R&D (H2)
Overall model
F statistic
Model R2
Adjusted R2
Incremental F

023∗

184∗
017
008

206∗
021
011
311∗∗

a
n = 133. Standardized coefﬁcients, and one-tailed tests of signiﬁcance for hypotheses since they connote direction.
†
p ≤ 010; ∗ p ≤ 005; ∗∗ p ≤ 001.

be interpreted as larger target ﬁrms positively impacting
performance. However, target ﬁrms are typically smaller
than their acquirer. In our sample, relative size has a
mean value of 0.10, with a standard deviation of 0.21,
suggesting that target ﬁrms up to half the size of their
acquirer are associated with higher performance. Next,
the relatedness of an acquisition is positively associated
with acquisition performance (Model 2; p < 005), conﬁrming the admonition of Larsson et al. (2004) that more
related acquisitions have higher potential.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that the announcement
effect is partially signiﬁcant (Model 2; p < 010), suggesting the stock market’s short-term reaction has a
tendency to signal long-term acquisition performance.
The results also indicate that acquisitions completed
for 1995 experienced signiﬁcantly lower returns than
the reference year 1994. Therefore, a potential concern
for interpreting the regression results involves whether
pooling acquisition activity from different years violates
the regression assumption of homoskedasticity, or equal
variance. Supplementary analysis using the GoldfeldQuandt F -test (Grifﬁths et al. 1993) showed that none
of the year pairings or full model combinations are signiﬁcant. This suggests that variance across the different
years is homoskedastic and regression analysis is appropriate. Finally, the insigniﬁcance of target ﬁrm type suggests that our results can be generalized across service
and manufacturing industries.
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The incremental F -statistic for Model 2 is signiﬁcant
(p < 001), indicating that adding interactions improves
the model’s explanatory power. Speciﬁcally, the interaction of target and acquirer R&D is signiﬁcant and
has a negative impact on ﬁrm performance (p < 005).
This supports the notion that target technology resources
involve resource substitution with an acquiring ﬁrm’s
technology resources (Hypothesis 1). Also consistent
with the hypothesis is the negative effect of target
R&D (Model 2; p < 005), which suggests surplus target technology resources can be counterproductive. We
also ﬁnd the interaction of an acquiring ﬁrm’s marketing resources and a target ﬁrm’s technology resources
is positive and signiﬁcantly impacts ﬁrm performance
(p < 005). This supports Hypothesis 2, which says that
target ﬁrm technology resources complement acquiring
ﬁrm marketing resources. Our research ﬁndings are consistent with prior research that shows acquisitions do
not lead to higher performance on average (King et al.
2004), but we ﬁnd resource interactions play a significant role in explaining the performance of acquiring
ﬁrms. In fact, we explain approximately twice the variance in ﬁrm performance from existing M&A research
that typically only examines direct effects (Sirower
1997, p. 158). The importance of considering interactions is further emphasized by the lack of signiﬁcance
for the main effects of acquirer resources.

Discussion

Our study offers new insights for RBT by showing that
acquiring and target ﬁrm resource proﬁles can be used
to predict acquiring ﬁrm performance. In answering the
need for empirical research examining RBT (Priem and
Butler 2001), we demonstrate that acquiring ﬁrms can
leverage external resources with substitution and complementary relationships to create competitive advantage. Consistent with RBT (Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993),
we ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms can overcome resource heterogeneity and immobility using acquisitions. By developing and testing interactions of acquirer and target
resources, we shed light on previously unexplained variance in M&A performance (King et al. 2004) and reinforce the need to examine interactions in M&A research
(Hitt et al. 1998, Hoskisson and Hitt 1990). Identifying
observable measures associated with abnormal acquiring
ﬁrm performance, as we have done here, represents an
important advancement in explaining observed acquisition activity.
Theoretical Discussion and Implications
Our ﬁndings suggest that acquisitions can be profitably used to gain access to technology resources. Our
results support research that suggests acquisition activity is one method ﬁrms use to manage their resource
proﬁles (Ahuja and Katila 2001, Capron and Mitchell
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1998, Capron and Pistre 2002) and overcome problems in the exchange of resources (Anand and Delios
2002, Williamson 1975). Although our sample of ﬁrms
exhibits an acquisition performance of zero, we identify
signiﬁcant factors that relate to both higher and lower
acquisition performance.
The signiﬁcant negative interaction in our model
supports the view that target R&D substitutes for an
acquirer’s R&D, or that a target ﬁrm with substantial R&D investments will produce greater value for
an acquiring ﬁrm with lower-than-average R&D intensity. Yet the difﬁculty of valuing and exchanging R&D
resources (Zahra 1996) drives acquiring ﬁrms to perform
R&D, so that they have the requisite absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990). We are unable
to answer how much absorptive capacity or acquirer
R&D spending is enough to perform these functions—an
important question for future research.13 Nevertheless,
we can conclude that different ﬁrm resource proﬁles,
resulting from different investment levels, suggest that
the ability to create value from a given target is heterogeneous across potential acquirers.
This is consistent with arguments that acquirers may
still earn abnormal returns if inimitable assets or skills
are leveraged or exchanged in an acquisition because
other potential bidders cannot achieve the same beneﬁt
(Barney 1988). Moreover, our results do not indicate that
when high-technology ﬁrms acquire high-technology
targets such an acquisition will necessarily result in
lower performance. Instead, our results illustrate that the
nature of technological resources between the acquiring and target ﬁrms generates substitution effects. Our
results—that a target ﬁrm’s technology resources act as
a substitute for an acquirer’s technology resources—ﬁll
an identiﬁed research need (Peteraf and Bergen 2003)
and help to resolve an ongoing debate about whether
acquired technology serves as a substitute for (Hitt et al.
1990, 1991) or a complement to (Cohen and Levinthal
1989, 1990; Veugelers 1997) internal development.
As a result, our research also illustrates the value
of understanding the underlying, complex relationships
between an acquiring ﬁrm’s resources and those of the
target ﬁrm. A ﬁrm that lacks speciﬁc technological resources, for example, is likely to seek a target ﬁrm
that possesses such resources. However, achieving abnormal returns may also depend on an acquiring ﬁrm’s
resources. Thus, an acquiring ﬁrm must begin with a
good understanding of its own resources if it hopes to
take advantage of interactions with the resources of a
target ﬁrm. Although the potential for value creation
is unlocked in the process of integration, an acquisition’s potential value may be limited from the start by
acquirer and target ﬁrm resource proﬁles. This reiterates the importance of considering the impact of target ﬁrm resources on acquisition success (Capron and
Mitchell 1998, Saxton and Dollinger 2004) and offers
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insight for further development of theory relating to the
prediction of acquisition performance. Importantly, we
ﬁnd that resource interactions can involve both resource
complements and substitutes. For technology resources,
both positive and negative marginal beneﬁts can exist for
an acquiring ﬁrm.
Managerial Discussion and Implications
This research also offers clear implications for practitioners. First, the model presented in our study provides
a useful framework for managers of acquiring ﬁrms to
use to evaluate the ﬁt between the resources of targets
and their own ﬁrms. It may also serve as a guide to
target selection and may offer an initial prediction of
acquisition performance.
Second, our results reiterate the importance of managerial decision making on acquisition performance.
We rely on measures that are visible to managers and
often under their control. Speciﬁcally, the value creation
potential and, therefore, the price that different acquirers may be willing to pay for a target will be different
because of differences in each ﬁrm’s prior investments
to develop unique resources that will interact with a target ﬁrm’s resources. There is unlikely to be a universal
value from acquiring a given target, so understanding
the value creation potential of a target for a ﬁrm will
improve the odds of avoiding the “winner’s curse” when
managers bid for target ﬁrms (Varaiya and Ferris 1987).
A third practitioner implication is that acquisitions
offer a viable means for obtaining needed external technology. A ﬁrm that lacks speciﬁc technology resources,
for example, may require an absorptive capacity to identify, value, and integrate target ﬁrm technology. As such,
the ultimate success of an acquisition may depend on
prior discretionary investments that build acquiring ﬁrm
resources as much as the resources held by a target.
Speciﬁcally, acquirers should seek targets with technology resources in areas where an acquiring ﬁrm is short
and (at the same time) ensure they have established the
necessary resource stocks to complement acquired technology resources.
Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
Our intention was to perform an exploratory study of
resource interactions on the performance of acquiring
ﬁrms. Our theory development and results highlight the
importance of understanding resource interactions and,
by extension, the potential impact of resource redeployment on acquisition success. Overall, there is a need for
continued research on resource interactions using other
methods and measures to extend our understanding of
the impact of resources on M&A performance, as well as
in other contexts. We address three main limitations of
our study that present opportunities for future research.
First, future research exploring additional aspects of
resources and other resource interactions between an
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acquirer and target ﬁrm will offer additional insight.
Our measures of technology and marketing resources
relied on observable information and prior practice in
extant research. R&D investments are recognized as
the foundation of a ﬁrm’s technological resources and
absorptive capacity, but other measures may provide
further insight. For example, patent content may offer
an alternate measure of technology resources for target
ﬁrms in the same or similar industries that could isolate the redundant components of technology between a
target and acquirer. Moreover, other measures of marketing resources, such as brand reputation or established
supplier or customer relationships, could be used. Future
research aimed at understanding the process of resource
development would improve our understanding and ability to measure these concepts and relationships.
Another opportunity relates to whether threshold levels
of absorptive capacity are needed to successfully acquire
and integrate R&D intensive targets. For example, King
and Driessnack (2003, p. 266) observe that “ﬁrms may
only need to perform enough R&D to remain aware of
external technology and maintain the ability to absorb
needed technological developments.” Our data suggest
the minimum level of R&D intensity required to evaluate and assimilate new technological resources is below
an industry’s average R&D intensity.14 Still, inadequate
investments can put potential returns (Courtney et al.
1997), as well as the success of subsequent acquisitions,
at risk.
Second, we did not examine the impact of implementation or acquisition integration. However, acquiring
ﬁrms are likely to recognize the importance of integrating the R&D stock from target ﬁrms because of interactions with acquiring ﬁrm resources (Thompson 1967),
with the implication that there is likely to be less variance regarding the degree of integration in the context
that we examine. In addition, we controlled for multiple potential issues associated with resource coordination and integration.
Still, a continuing need remains to examine the impacts of acquisition implementation (Ramanujam and
Varadarajan 1989) for additional insight into achieving
acquisition success. It would be interesting to explore
whether the process of selecting a target ﬁrm inﬂuences
integration, and whether an acquirer adjusts its processes
or resource redeployment (i.e., integration depth) based
on information disclosed through the integration process. A related question involves the commercialization
of technology. Future research could build on Puranam
et al. (2006) to examine the prevalence of resources in
target and acquiring ﬁrms that facilitate turning technology into products.
Third, we examined R&D-intensive target ﬁrms in
the United States, where data are publicly available.
Although 90% of all high-technology acquisitions involve U.S. ﬁrms (Inkpen et al. 2000), enhancing the
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generalizability of the resource interactions we observed
requires research in other contexts. Our focus on technology target ﬁrms facilitated the identiﬁcation and measurement of known resource exchanges (Capron and
Mitchell 1998); however, research examining additional
resource interactions and strategies is warranted. For
example, examining the impact of acquisitions on ﬁrms
outside the United States is an additional opportunity
for research. The examination of resource interactions
in M&A subgroups and other settings, such as alliances,
would also be worthwhile.
In closing, the dollar value of acquisition activity
remains high, and the expectation is for increased acquisition activity as ﬁrms in technology industries continue
to consolidate (Berman 2007b, Schonfeld and Malik
2003). Our focus on resource interactions supports existing theory that the resource proﬁles of both acquiring
and target ﬁrms impact acquisition performance (Barney
1988, Capron et al. 1998, Capron and Pistre 2002, King
et al. 2003). Identifying a role for both resource substitution and resource complements in acquisitions also
offers new insights into target ﬁrm selection, the source
of value from ﬁrm resources, and acquirer performance.
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Appendix. Performance Measurement
Strategic management literature in general (Daily 1994, Daily
et al. 2002) and acquisition research speciﬁcally (Javidan et al.
2004) do not provide a consensus for measuring ﬁrm performance. Generally, M&A research focuses on ﬁnancial performance using either accounting or stock market measures. We
elected to avoid using accounting measures of performance
because they tend to have a historical focus (Chakravarthy
1986) and, in the case of return on assets, can be biased by
the method of accounting for an acquisition (Ravenscraft and
Scherer 1987, Sirower 1997). This left a choice between shortor long-term stock market measures of performance.
The primary difference between short- and long-term measures of stock performance is that they relate to “expected”
or “realized” returns, respectively. A criticism of short-term
stock market measures in M&A research is that they may
downwardly bias abnormal returns because of the implicit
assumption that all the information needed to accurately price
the impact of an acquisition, when it is announced, is available to the market (Loderer and Martin 1992, Lubatkin and
Shrieves 1986). The need for longitudinal measures in M&A
research (Puranam et al. 2006) shows that acquisitions represent complex events where information is revealed over time
(Lubatkin 1987). Several researchers suggest three years as
a sufﬁcient amount of time to observe changes in ﬁrm postacquisition performance (Ingham et al. 1992, Lubatkin et al.
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2001). Time frames of even two years may be too short to
discover how acquisitions contribute to an acquiring ﬁrm’s
performance (Saxton and Dollinger 2004).
Therefore, we selected a long-term stock measure. Jensen’s
alpha (Jensen 1968), a variation of the two-parameter market
model previously used (Farjoun 1998; Hoskisson et al. 1993,
1994), was our primary performance measure. An advantage
of Jensen’s alpha is that it compares the return of an acquiring
ﬁrm with a benchmark from a common starting point. We use
the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 as our benchmark for calculating abnormal returns, as acquiring ﬁrms had an average
market capitalization of $6.05 billion and represented a diverse
set of industries. (Note: Only target ﬁrms were limited to hightechnology industries.) Further, the S&P 500 provides a recognized stock market benchmark of large ﬁrms and represents
a reasonable rate of return that an acquisition should exceed if
it is expected to contribute to a ﬁrm’s competitive advantage.
Additionally, Jensen’s alpha measures the average difference
between the market benchmark’s return and the return of the
ﬁrm for the time unit (i.e., month) used (Alexander and Francis 1986), rather than the return over the entire window (i.e.,
three years). The return for the time unit should be less susceptible to changes in event window than buy and hold returns
that simply calculate the return between two points in time.
For each month after an acquisition (t = 1 to 36) the following regression model was used to calculate Jensen’s alpha:
Rit = i +

i

Rmt +

it 

where
Rit is the monthly rate of return of ﬁrm i during month t
i is Jensen’s alpha for ﬁrm i
i is ﬁrm i’s stock price variance relative to the variance of
the market benchmark (m)
Rmt is the monthly rate of return of the market benchmark
(m) during month t
it is the random error term.
Positive values of Jensen’s alpha indicate that an acquiring
ﬁrm outperformed the market benchmark or S&P 500. Comparing a ﬁrm’s stock performance with a benchmark portfolio
offers several beneﬁts, including: (1) comparing an acquirer
with a benchmark of multiple ﬁrms that eliminates matching ﬁrms to calculate abnormal returns, and (2) calculating
the average abnormal return of investing in a ﬁrm against a
benchmark over the same time period. This eliminates a preannouncement estimation period needed for the capital asset
pricing model to estimate a ﬁrm’s normal return. However,
long-term stock market measures of ﬁrm performance are also
subject to criticism because of the potential for confounding
events (Williams and Siegel 1997).
Because all our measures are observable on the day an
acquisition is announced, the stock market may be able to
accurately classify whether an acquisition can be expected
to create value (Sirower 1997, p. 123). Therefore, we added
a control for an acquisition’s “announcement effect” using
a short-term stock market measure of an acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns. We calculated cumulative abnormal
returns for each acquirer one day before announcement to one
day after announcement (three-day window), using the CRSP
equally weighted market index for benchmark portfolio. The

market model ﬁrst estimates j and
during the estimation period
Rjt = j +

j Rmt

j

from returns earned

+ jt 

where Rjt is the rate of return on the common stock of the
jth ﬁrm on day t; Rmt is the rate of return of a market index
on day t; jt is the random error term. j is a parameter that
measures the sensitivity of Rjt to the market index. The abnormal return for ﬁrm j on day t is deﬁned as:
ARjt = Rjt − j +

j Rmt



where t now corresponds to the event window. The variable
used in our models—cumulative abnormal returns—is the sum
of the abnormal returns for the three-day event window. The
resulting announcement effects were then transformed into a
categorical variable, with “0” assigned to acquisitions with a
negative announcement effect and a “1” assigned to acquisitions with a positive announcement effect. The resulting variable was used as a control in our regression model.

Endnotes
1

Our focus on R&D-intensive ﬁrms is driven by theory and
the level of observed activity, as it is estimated that technology
ﬁrms represent over one-ﬁfth the number and two-ﬁfths the
value of acquisitions (Inkpen et al. 2000).
2
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this succinct description.
3
The impact of nonredundant R&D between target and acquiring ﬁrms should be conservative, as nonredundant R&D would
suggest a positive impact from new resource combinations.
4
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helping
to make this link to our dependent variable explicit.
5
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the reverse relationship (i.e., target marketing and
acquirer R&D) could also exist. In our sample, 68% of target
ﬁrms reported no marketing expenditures for the three-years
prior to their being acquired. This is consistent with acquiring
ﬁrms having marketing resources that can be extended to other
markets and products (Peteraf 1993, Wernerfelt 1988).
6
COMPUSTAT assigns an SIC code that best describes a
ﬁrm’s business. If a ﬁrm is involved in more than one industry,
it may be assigned a more general code indicated by a zero
entered for the third and fourth digits (Kahle and Walkling
1996). A four-digit code is only used when a ﬁrm’s primary
focus is in a single industry. Additionally, Kahle and Walkling
(1996) compare samples matched on COMPUSTAT and CRSP
SIC codes and conclude that the use of SIC codes assigned
by COMPUSTAT is more powerful in detecting abnormal
performance.
7
While patents were considered a measure, they were not used
for two key reasons: (1) Patents were not consistently reported
for our sample of target ﬁrms (i.e., only approximately 40%
of sampled ﬁrms held patents), and (2) Acquiring ﬁrms in our
sample operated in multiple industries, where patent publication was not consistently valued across the industries (Ahuja
and Katila 2001, Brusoni et al. 2001).
8
Although we follow available guidance on depreciating R&D,
we thank an anonymous reviewer for recognizing that the
depreciation rate of R&D may vary across industries.
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Comparing target ﬁrm R&D stock to acquirer R&D intensity
compensates for large differences in target and acquiring ﬁrm
size, while capturing the extent of potential resource redundancies from a target ﬁrm’s R&D investments.
10
Sensitivity analysis using a sales measure of relative size
provided similar results.
11
Because research suggests that prior performance may impact the performance of acquiring ﬁrms, we control for it as
a potential extraneous effect. A positive coefﬁcient on our
proﬁtability variable could be interpreted as contributing to
acquirer performance by either: (1) a more proﬁtable acquirer,
keeping target ROS constant, continuing to outperform, or
(2) a less proﬁtable target, keeping acquirer ROS constant,
leading to higher performance through a disciplinary function
of target ﬁrm management. We thank an anonymous reviewer
for prompting this explanation.
12
Note that acquirers still spent signiﬁcant sums on R&D;
average R&D expenditures for the three years prior to an
acquisition for our sample of acquiring ﬁrms are $502 million
per ﬁrm.
13
We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
14
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this
insight.
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